

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
OFFICE OF SECURITY
June 1967

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INTRODUCTION

1. Full Inspector General surveys were made of the Office of Security in 1954 and again in 1960. A special study of personnel security standards, procedures, and practices, made at the specific request of the Director, was completed in October 1963. An Agency-wide review of our industrial security programs was completed in September 1965.

2. The basic functions of the Office of Security have changed little since those surveys and studies were made. Its responsibilities in the field of industrial security have been broadened, but too recently to permit a valid assessment of performance. The Office still operates under the same legislative authorities, Executive Orders, and broad national policy guidance provided by certain NSCID's and DCID's. Hence, we see no need to repeat here the substance of the various enabling and action policy documents that were quoted from or summarized in earlier Inspector General reports.

3. The 1960 Inspector General's report of survey noted that many of the internal CIA regulations pertaining to the Office of Security were out of date and needed to be revised and reissued. We found in this current survey that the needed revisions had been made in Agency regulations, Series 10.

4. The October 1963 survey of personnel security in CIA was undertaken to determine whether CIA regulations and procedures for

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maintaining personnel security (a) were adequate; (b) were known, understood, and followed; and (c) were effective. The results of our investigation supported the conclusion that the quality of personnel security in CIA is excellent. That survey took particular note of the security reinvestigation program that had then been under way for over two years. It supplements the reinvestigations that result from reviews of accumulated security files, from major changes in assignment, or from a change in the employee's clearance status. We found that the program was going slowly because of the press of current work. The program is pursued during slack periods and set aside during heavy workload periods. The near-zero rate of unfavorable findings suggested to us that the reinvestigation program could safely be pursued at about the same level. We also found the work of the Security Research Staff to be particularly noteworthy. It concerns itself with problems having possible counterintelligence implications. It can and does take the time to inquire in depth, to review, and to analyze. It provides an additional check on the effectiveness of routine personnel security measures. Our findings with respect to the reinvestigation program and the activities of the Security Research Staff in late 1963 are still valid today.

5. In several areas of activity we found little change in responsibilities, functions, or performance since our last full inspection in 1960; hence, we have omitted comment on certain staffs, branches,


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and functions that would merely duplicate what we have already said about them. We do, however, describe and comment upon recent organizational and procedural changes in the Office and make recommendations for improvement where we think appropriate.

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7. We should like to take particular note of the excellent cooperation and the attitude of helpfulness in carrying out our survey, which we encountered at all levels within the Office. It is evident that a major effort has been made to develop an effective Security organization; the integrity of the management of the Office of Security cannot be questioned. In certain areas, the Office appears to be understaffed to cope with current workloads and to be burdened with excessive paper work. It is to these problems that many of our recommendations are addressed.

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